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Abstract  
Energy efficiency resource standards (EERS) refer to policies that require utilities and 
other covered entities to achieve quantitative goals for reducing energy use by a certain year. 
EERS policies generally apply to electricity and natural gas sales and electricity peak demand, 
though they also cover other energy sources in Europe. Our study aggregates information about 
the requirements of existing EERS policies for electricity sales in the United States. We convert 
quantitative goals into comparable terms to compare the nominal stringency of EERS programs 
across states. EERS programs also differ in their nonquantitative requirements, including 
flexibility measures, measurement and verification programs, and penalties and positive 
incentives. We compare the U.S. policies to similar policies in the European Union and discuss 
important policy issues, including exogenous changes in fuel prices and issues with utility 
management of energy efficiency programs.  
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Putting a Floor on Energy Savings: Comparing State Energy 
Efficiency Resource Standards 
Karen Palmer, Samuel Grausz, Blair Beasley, and Tim Brennan* 
Introduction 
Out of concern for environmental harm, climate change, and the expense of generation 
and transmission capacity to meet peak demands, governments have been looking at a wide 
range of policies to change the amount of energy we use and the portfolio of fuels used to 
generate it. Among the policies that have been considered are carbon taxes, marketable 
emissions permit (cap-and-trade) programs, renewable portfolio standards (RPS) and clean 
energy standards (CES), real-time retail electricity pricing, demand response programs (such as 
critical peak period rebates or utility air conditioner controls), and programs to promote energy 
efficiency (i.e., the use of equipment and appliances that use less electricity or gas to provide a 
given level of service). One type of policy receiving increased attention, particularly at the state 
level in the United States but also in Europe, is the energy efficiency resource standard (EERS). 
We describe the individual standards in more detail below, but in general, EERS programs 
consist of mandates to reduce the use of electricity and natural gas by some prescribed 
percentage or amount, by some prescribed time (Nadel 2006). Twenty states have adopted EERS 
programs. Maryland’s EmPower program, for example, envisions reducing electricity use per 
capita by 15 percent of 2007 levels by 2015 (Maryland Energy Administration 2008). 
State statutes and public utility commission orders that establish or implement EERS 
policies cite a largely homogeneous list of reasons for enacting the standards. Common 
rationales include: environmental and public health benefits, green jobs creation, deferment of 
electricity infrastructure improvements, greenhouse gas reductions, energy savings, reduced 
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reliance on fossil fuels, and energy security. For example, the 2006 California Assembly Bill No. 
20211 states that, ―Expanding California’s energy efficiency programs will promote lower energy 
bills, protect public health, improve environmental quality, stimulate sustainable economic 
development, create new employment opportunities, and reduce reliance on imported fuels.‖2 
We take a close look at different features of the EERS policies for electricity that have 
been adopted in the states. We assess the relative stringency of different state policies; the role of 
different flexibility mechanisms; approaches to evaluation, measurement, and verification; and 
penalties for noncompliance. We also describe the differences in regulatory incentives for utility 
efficiency programs. To facilitate comparison of policy stringency across the states, we translate 
each state’s nominal EERS policy goal into comparable annual energy savings and compare this 
goal to the state’s covered and total energy sales. We also briefly survey similar policies in 
Europe, highlighting the ways in which they differ from U.S. policies. Further, we discuss a 
number of important implementation challenges, including interactions with other policies, 
effects of exogenous fuel and electricity price changes, and advantages and disadvantages of 
implementing the policy through utilities.3  
States vary substantially in the stringency and flexibility of their EERS policies, but in 
general we found the EERS policies to be quite stringent. The policies require reductions on 
average equal to 12.7 percent of covered load and 11.5 percent of total state load. These values 
are well in excess of past energy efficiency requirements, though within the range of energy 
savings from energy efficiency programs expected over the next decade by experts in the field.4  
States also vary in the flexibility of their policies. Currently, 13 states explicitly allow one 
or more of a broader set of efficiency investments beyond those that target reductions in 
                                                 
1 Assembly Bill 2021, California Statutes of 2006, chapter 734. 
2 Many other states offer similar policy rationales. For example, New Mexico’s Efficient Use of Energy Act states 
that, ―cost-effective energy efficiency and load management programs undertaken by public utilities can provide 
significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, regulated air emissions, water consumption and natural resource 
depletion, and can avoid or delay the need for more expensive generation, transmission and distribution 
infrastructure.‖ 
3 A companion paper (Brennan and Palmer 2012) compares EERS policies to policies that directly address the 
problems motivating them and analyzes conditions for when an EERS will achieve optimal outcomes in the face of 
changing demand—an issue arising because the typical EERS is a floor on energy efficiency, not a cap on energy 
use. 
4 Sciortino et al. (2011) also categorize and compare EERS policies across U.S. states. We have consulted 
extensively on our results with Sciortino et al in the preparation of this report and compare our results directly to 




customer use of electricity to be eligible for compliance, but only two states allow efficiency 
credit banking. Seven states have explicit penalties for noncompliance, and an additional ten 
states have financial rewards for compliance that create implicit penalties at the margin. In 
virtually all cases, EERS standards require the energy efficiency programs used to produce 
energy savings to pass a cost benefit test where the benefits of savings depend on the costs of 
producing electricity. As a result the effects of EERS policies are potentially sensitive—in 
unexpected ways—to changes in the underlying economics of electricity supply. Last, the role 
that regulated utilities should play in the provision of energy efficiency services is debatable. The 
current practice in many states of relying primarily on regulated utilities to deliver energy 
efficiency services may be more the result of political considerations than of economic 
efficiency. 
Although we focus our empirical analysis on electricity use EERS policies, we expect 
that our methods will apply in the electricity peak demand and natural gas use settings. We hope 
that this exercise provides a basis for further research, particularly in testing the effectiveness of 
EERS policies and comparing them to other energy and environmental policies. These two 
challenges are particularly formidable as many of these programs are new. In addition, because 
states do not choose to adopt EERS policies at random, empirical testing of their effects becomes 
significantly more difficult. This review should be of interest, not just to other states that are 
considering the adoption of EERS programs, but also to the federal government, which might 
look to an EERS as an alternative to politically infeasible emissions tax or cap-and-trade 
programs.5  
Overview of State EERS Policies 
A number of states have adopted a variety of policies that seek to incentivize or mandate 
energy efficiency by setting broad-based goals or targets. For the purposes of this report, we 
define an EERS as a legally binding numeric target for energy use reduction stated in either 
percentage or quantity terms. Not every energy efficiency policy counts. For example, a state 
that has energy efficiency goals but no entity or group of entities that is legally obligated to meet 
                                                 
5 In June 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the American Clean Energy and Security Act (generally 
known as the Waxman–Markey bill), which included cap-and-trade provisions for carbon dioxide. This legislation 
did not pass the Senate, and prospects for passage of similar legislation in the current Congress appear minimal. 
Concern over deficit reduction and the desire to hold down or lower tax rates in other parts of the economy may spur 




those goals does not have an EERS. Similarly, any state that has defined an EERS but not 
provided funding nor required obligated entities to fund the projects, does not have a legally 
binding policy and thus is not included.6 Also, we do not include states, such as Nevada, North 
Carolina, and Connecticut, that allow energy savings from efficiency investments to earn credit 
under the state RPS, but do not have a separate, multi-year energy efficiency policy. Sciortino et 
al. (2011) and other policy databases classify Maine, Oregon and Texas as having an EERS; 
however, because neither state has a legally binding energy savings goal, we exclude all three 
from our list.7 
Based on this definition, 20 states have EERS policies for electricity. EERS policies are 
typically specified for energy (electricity and/or natural gas) use, and sometimes for reductions in 
peak electricity consumption; we focus on EERS policies targeting electricity use. A list of states 
with EERS policies for electricity use overall, with their adoption years, is shown in Table 1.8  
                                                 
6 Wisconsin is the best example of this situation. The state passed a funding increase for EERS programs in 
December 2010. However, that increase was revoked in the 2011 Wisconsin Act 32 of the 2011-2013 Biennial 
Budget Act, effectively forcing utilities to only maintain existing programs.  
7 Texas has an EERS for peak electricity demand which requires utilities to report resulting reductions in electricity 
sales, but does not have a stand-alone binding standard for reductions in electricity sales.  
8 Washington State has an EERS, but we were not able to gather suffient information to calculate its stingency. As a 




Table 1. States with EERS Policies and Adoption Years 
 
Among electricity use EERS policies, perhaps the most salient feature is the required 
reduction in electricity use. To understand and compare required reductions across EERS 
programs, we need to define some terms. The reference case is our estimate of the amount of 
electricity that would be used in a given year but for the EERS. The basis is the quantity from 
which a percentage reduction is calculated. Different terms are necessary because the percentage 
reduction is not calculated against the reference case. For example, in Maryland the goal is to 
reduce per-capita electricity use in 2015 by 15 percent of the amount of electricity used in 2007. 
In our terminology, the amount of electricity that would have been used in 2015 but for the 
EERS is the reference case, and the amount of electricity used in 2007 is the basis.  
Table 2 summarizes the policy requirements of each state program in or by the final year 
specified in the policy. As that table shows, EERS policies characterize reductions in one of two 
different ways: annual or cumulative reductions. An annual reduction specifies the new energy 
savings required in a given year from investments made in that year, whereas a cumulative 
reduction sets the total amount of reductions to be achieved in a given year from all policies 
implemented up through that year. Each of these definitions of energy use reduction can be 
characterized as either quantity or percentage reductions. Policies with a quantity reduction 
specify the requirement in physical units, whereas policies with a percentage reduction specify 

























Table 2. EERS Reduction Requirements in Final Year9 of Policy 
 
The quantity reductions shown in Table 2 are easy to compare across states. The 
percentage reductions, however, are not because they are defined relative to bases that vary 
across states. Thus, to compare the percentage reduction policies, we need to understand these 
bases. Table 3 classifies the bases into two major types—fixed and rolling. Fixed bases establish 
a single reference period, whether it’s a past year or a forecasted future year, and measure 
compliance relative to electricity usage in that period.10 Rolling bases refer to a moving period 
that varies with the year of compliance, whether it’s the current year, the previous year, or an 
                                                 
9 Final year refers to the last year in which the policy is defined in the legislation. For policies that have 
requirements extending indefinitely beyond their final year, we assumed a final year of 2020.  
10 A strict legal interpretation of fixed future bases (implemented in New York and Pennsylvania) might require 
utilities to keep energy consumption below a set level (an energy cap) rather than to prove a certain amount of 
reductions. However, this does not seem to be an issue for either state because New York translates its percentage 
goals into physical unit targets, and Pennsylvania’s initial forecast period now lies in the past, effectively creating a 
historical fixed-year basis going forward. 
Nominal Requirement
State Year Reduction Measure Requirement
Arizona 2020 Cumulative Percent 22.00%
Arkansas 2013 Annual Percent 0.75%
California 2020 Annual Quantity 1,788
Colorado 2020 Annual Quantity 549
Florida 2019 Annual Quantity 703
Hawaii 2030 Annual Quantity 195
Iowa 2020 Annual Percent 1.50%
Illinois 2020 Annual Percent 2.00%
Indiana 2020 Annual Percent 2.00%
Maryland 2015 Cumulative Percent 15.00%
Massachusetts 2012 Annual Quantity 1,103
Michigan 2020 Annual Percent 1.00%
Minnesota 2020 Annual Percent 1.50%
New Mexico 2020 Cumulative Percent 10.00%
New York 2015 Cumulative Quantity 24,927
Ohio 2025 Annual Percent 2.00%
Pennsylvania 2013 Cumulative Percent 3.00%
Rhode Island 2014 Annual Quantity 189




average of multiple previous years. States that specify their reductions in quantity reductions 
(physical units), as explained above, do not require a basis for measuring required energy 
savings.11 
Table 3. Basis Definition for States with EERS Policies 
 
                                                 
11 Both New York and Rhode Island initially specify their policy as a percentage reduction, but ultimately respecify 
the policy as a quantity reduction. As such, we present the policy as a quantity reduction because the quantity 
reductions are ultimately the binding requirement. 
Basis





Arizona Rolling 1 Sales





Iowa Rolling 3 Sales
Illinois Rolling 1 Sales
Indiana Rolling 3 Sales
Maryland Fixed 2007 Per-Capita Sales
Massachusetts None Sales
Michigan Rolling 1 Sales
Minnesota Rolling 3 Sales
New Mexico Fixed 2005 Sales
New York None Sales
Ohio Rolling 3 Sales
Pennsylvania Fixed 2009 Sales
Rhode Island None Sales
Vermont None Sales
Notes:
Policies with baseline type "Rolling" relate to requirements denominated in 
percentage of previous or current year(s) consumption. 
Policies with baseline type "Fixed" relate to requirements denominated in 
percentage of consumption in a given year. 
Policies with baseline type "None" relate to requirements denominated in 
physical units.
Rolling period refers to the number of years prior ot the compliance year that 




Unlike fixed bases, rolling bases are affected by the level of compliance in prior years. 
Higher levels of savings in a particular year reduce savings requirements in future years by 
reducing the basis from which percentage reductions are calculated. Rolling bases also introduce 
more uncertainty by linking required reductions to exogenous changes in energy sales resulting 
from the level of economic activity, weather, demographics, or other factors. How these factors 
might cause utilities to move forward or delay reductions is an open question. Except for 
Maryland, states define their bases in terms of total electricity sales for energy-related policies. 
Maryland uses per capita sales as a basis. Using per capita sales as a basis adds the uncertainty of 
population growth to the eventual policy requirements.  
Bases also very in terms of how much and which sales are covered by the policy and, 
relatedly, which entities are responsible for complying with the policy, as shown in Table 4. 
States use a variety of terms to describe their energy sector participants, such as utilities, public 
utilities, and electricity distribution companies. In Table 4, we standardize these terms into three 
possibilities: investor-owned utilities (IOUs), cooperative (co-op) utilities, and municipal 




Table 4. Policy Coverage and Obligated Entities 
 
% of State Sales Covered
State Description Share Obligated Entities Notes
Arizona All except excluded 99% All utilities Excludes utilities < $5,000,000 in annual revenue and co-op utilities with less 
than 25% of customers in AZ, all co-op utilities comply with separate standard 
(75% of normal standard)
Arkansas IOUs 61% IOUs
California IOUs 74% IOUs
Colorado IOUs 57% IOUs
Florida All except excluded 84% All utilities Only utilties > 2000 GWH annual sales
Hawaii All 100% All utilities
Iowa IOUs 74% IOUs
Illinois IOUs except excluded 89% IOUs, DCEO Only IOUs > 100,000 customers in IL, IOUs and Department of Commerce and 
Economic Opportunity (DCEO) responsible for 75% and 25% of obligation 
respectively
Indiana All 100% All utilities
Maryland All 100% All utilities, other 
entities
Massachusetts IOUs 86% IOUs
Michigan All 100% All utilities 88.9% (IOUs), 7.8% (municipal utilities), and 3.4% (co-ops) of obligation
Minnesota All 100% All utilities
New Mexico IOUs 67% IOUs Co-op utilities outside the jurisdication of the Public Utility Commission (PUC) 
but required to develop voluntary targets
New York All 100% IOUs, NYSERDA, other 
entities
Obligation shared between multiple entities; share of observations 
determined by the Public Service Commission (PSC)
Ohio IOUs 88% IOUs
Pennsylvania IOUs except excluded 96% IOUs IOUs > 100,000 customers
Rhode Island All 100% All utilities Excludes the Pascoag Utility District and Block Island Power Company
Vermont All except excluded 94% Efficiency Vermont Excludes the City of Burlington
Notes:
Covered Sales Share is the percent of 2009 electricity sales covered under the EERS divided by the total state electricity sales.
Arizona requires co-op utilities to only achieve 75% of the standard. We do not include this in further calculations. 
Arizona allows utilities to use peak demand reductions to meet up to 2 percentage points of their requirements in 2020. The equivalent load reduction is 




In roughly half of the states, the EERS policy covers all utilities and thus all load, and in 
the other half it covers only investor-owned utilities (IOUs), in some cases because of the limited 
jurisdiction of the state regulatory commission that typically oversees implementation of the 
policy. A few states also include explicit size limitations on obligated entities; for example, 
Illinois covers only IOUs with more than 100,000 customers. In some states, the choice of 
obligated entities significantly narrows the scope of the policy, such as in Colorado and New 
Mexico, where cooperatives (co-ops) and municipal utilities represent a large share of state sales 
but are not obligated to comply with the EERS. Obligation for compliance with the policy 
typically lies with the utilities, although a few states also place obligations on nonutility actors, 
including the Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity in Illinois, the New York 
State Energy & Research Development Authority in New York, and Efficiency Vermont in 
Vermont. 
Stringency 
We compare the relative stringency of each policy by calculating the cumulative quantity 
of reductions—the reductions required from all policies implemented up to the compliance year 
measured in physical units—required by each policy in the last year of the policy. We also 
calculate the ratio of required savings to total sales of both covered entities and all electric 
retailers within each state.12 To make these comparisons at particular points in time, we take 
projected population growth by state from Census Bureau projections (U.S. Census Bureau 
2004) and assume that, in the absence of the EERS, electricity sales would grow at 0.9 percent 
per year.13 We also assume that the relevant set of utilities within the state will fully comply with 
all EERS policy requirements and achieve the same level of annual reduction in each year after 
implementation. In reality, the viability of these conditions will depend on monitoring and 
measurement, which we discuss below. The converted requirements are shown in Table 5; the 
calculations underlying this conversion are described in Appendix A.  
                                                 
12 We perform this comparison for electricity sales policies but not for electricity peak policies as we could not find 
projections of peak electricity by state. 
13 We assume a 0.9 percent rate of annual growth in demand in the absence of the EERS policies because this is the 
annual growth rate in electricity consumption found by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) in its 
Annual Energy Outlook 2011 (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2011). We chose to make this latter 
assumption rather than use state-level projections from another source as those projections might include the 




Table 5. Comparison of Nominal Required Reductions and Converted Stringency in the Final Year of the Policy 
  
Nominal Requirement Standardized Requirement






Arizona 2020 Cumulative Percent 22.00% 14,635 18.2% 18.1%
Arkansas 2013 Annual Percent 0.75% 401 1.5% 0.9%
California 2020 Annual Quantity 1,788 34,303 16.2% 12.0%
Colorado 2020 Annual Quantity 549 4,793 14.9% 8.5%
Florida 2019 Annual Quantity 703 7,843 3.8% 3.2%
Hawaii 2030 Annual Quantity 195 4,300 35.2% 35.2%
Iowa 2020 Annual Percent 1.50% 4,777 13.4% 9.9%
Illinois 2020 Annual Percent 2.00% 21,562 16.1% 14.3%
Indiana 2020 Annual Percent 2.00% 13,853 12.6% 12.6%
Maryland 2015 Cumulative Percent 15.00% 10,641 16.1% 16.1%
Massachusetts 2012 Annual Quantity 1,103 2,625 5.5% 4.7%
Michigan 2020 Annual Percent 1.00% 10,373 9.6% 9.6%
Minnesota 2020 Annual Percent 1.50% 10,377 14.7% 14.7%
New Mexico 2020 Cumulative Percent 10.00% 1,393 8.7% 5.8%
New York 2015 Cumulative Quantity 24,927 24,927 16.9% 16.9%
Ohio 2025 Annual Percent 2.00% 28,399 19.1% 16.8%
Pennsylvania 2013 Cumulative Percent 3.00% 4,152 2.9% 2.8%
Rhode Island 2014 Annual Quantity 189 796 10.0% 10.0%
Vermont 2011 Annual Quantity 120 360 6.9% 6.4%
Notes:
Policies defined with last year requirements prior to 2020 continuing each year after their final specified year are 
shown with a final year of 2020.
All non-standardized non-percent electricity requirements denominated in million KWhs. 
All standardized requirements denominated in million KWhs. Resources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
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Converting and comparing the stringencies of the policies provides a number of 
important insights about the policies’ relative requirements. The mean of the requirements as a 
percent of covered load in the reference case is 12.7 percent and the median is 13.4 percent. The 
majority of policies are clustered relatively narrowly around the means, with the first quartile at 
7.8 percent and the third quartile at 16.2 percent. The most stringent policy is Hawaii’s, requiring 
energy efficiency equal to 35.2 percent by 2030 of covered load, and the least stringent is 
Arkansas’s, requiring only 1.5 percent by 2013. Other high requirement states include Ohio (19.1 
percent in 2025), Arizona (18.2 percent in 2020), and New York (16.9 percent in 2015).  
These results remain largely the same when we look at energy efficiency as a percent of 
total state demand. Average requirements decrease to 11.5 percent and the median to 10 percent, 
with the first and third quartiles decreasing to 6.1 percent and 15.4 percent. The largest changes 
occur in Colorado, Arkansas, and New Mexico, where the low percentage of total state load 
covered results in the EERS policies requiring a significantly smaller percentage of total state 
load than percentage of covered state load.  
These EERS goals significantly exceed historical energy efficiency savings. According to 
the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA (2011), utilities report total cumulative energy 
savings in 2010 from ratepayer-funded energy efficiency programs equal to 2.3 percent of total 
electricity sales in that year. These findings are echoed by Arimura et al. (2011), who estimate 
that between the early 1990s and 2006, ratepayer-funded energy efficiency programs saved an 
average of 1.8 percent of electricity sales per year. The relationship between the EERS goals and 
these estimates of past savings suggest that the EERS requirements will likely be binding as they 
require utilities to achieve more energy savings than they have achieved historically as a result of 
normal behavior and pre-existing policies.  
The EERS goals are broadly in line, however, with the level of savings that energy 
efficiency experts expect future policies to achieve. Farugui and Mitarotonda (2011) surveyed 
energy efficiency experts to determine how much energy savings they expected U.S. energy 
efficiency policies to produce by 2020. These experts believe that energy use will fall between 5 
and 15 percent relative to a world without energy efficiency policies. These expectations are 
consistent with the goals of the majority of state EERS policies. 
Generally, these results reveal that the nominal policy goals can often mask the 
stringency of the ultimate requirement. Small requirements phrased in terms of annual 
reductions, requiring energy efficiency from projects initiated in that year, can quickly build up 
into significant cumulative requirements. Assuming that states require utilities to continue Resources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
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projects once started and that customers continue to realize energy savings from projects in the 
years after initiation, these cumulative requirements would generate energy savings equal to a 
significant percentage of reference utility load. Hawaii is a prime example of this situation. 
Hawaii’s annual requirement of between 195 and 197 GWhs of energy efficiency each year from 
2009 to 2030 adds up to a cumulative requirement of 35.2 percent of covered load in 2030.14  
These measures of stringency indicate the requirements of the policy in physical units, 
but do not indicate the expenditures associated with encouraging the adoption of efficient 
appliances and equipment or building retrofits or the economic cost of meeting those 
requirements. Both of these measures could vary substantially across states. Expenditures by 
utilities or other responsible parties are of interest in part because they affect electricity rates, 
which are highly visible politically.15 Expenditures also play a role in assessments of which 
energy efficiency measures could be used to achieve the goals of an EERS and pass traditional 
regulatory cost–benefit tests, as discussed below. Economic costs—measured by the value of 
what is given up to achieve the energy use reduction goals of the EERS and attain the associated 
environmental or other benefits—should ideally be a consideration when setting the stringency 
of the EERS policy. Both economic costs and expenditures may be an increasing function of the 
energy savings target or the stringency of the policy.  
Both expenditures and economic costs will also depend on the flexibility of the EERS 
policy, which we address further in the next section.16 In general, flexibility mechanisms enable 
                                                 
14 This calculation assumes that savings from investments made early in the time horizon persist until the end with 
no errosion of performance and thus of savings. 
15 Note that EIA (2011) collects data each year from utilties about their expenditures on energy efficiency programs 
in their Form 861 survey, and the Consortium for Energy Efficiency (2010) collects information from utilities and 
other entities that administer efficiency programs regarding their expenditures in past years and their budgets in 
current years for these activities. 
16 We also do not examine compliance to date with these standards, but this issue is addressed by Sciortino et al. 
(2011). These authors interviewed state officials connected with each of the EERS policies that had been in place for 
at least two years as of 2010. They collected information on relevant energy savings, as measured by the relevant 
body in each state, and compared these to their calculations of targets. Of the 17 states that they consider, only six 
(Vermont, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania) failed to meet their electricity 
savings goals for 2010 (or, in the case of a couple of states, 2009). The two states that saw the biggest gap between 
targeted savings and realized savings, Maryland and New York, are among those with the most stringent targets, 
although the deadlines for meeting those targets are well into the future. Because Sciortino et al. use publicly 
available measures of energy savings, in many cases these estimates may not be verifiable. They also may be gross 
savings, as opposed to net savings measures that focus on installations that are clearly the result of an efficiency 
measure or program rather than savings that would have occurred in the baseline. They also acknowledge that they 
have not accounted for differences in evaluation methods across the states that could affect savings estimates.  Resources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
14 
obligated entities to engage in energy efficiency projects when such projects have the least cost 
or pay other entities with lower costs to implement the reductions. 
Flexibility 
EERS policies are made more flexible by including a more expansive definition of an 
energy efficiency resource or by allowing trading of energy efficiency savings across different 
obligated entities within the state. States generally allow a broad range of end-use efficiency 
programs to count toward energy efficiency requirements, including home weatherization; light 
bulb and appliance replacement; improvements in industrial heating, ventilation, and air 
conditioning systems; and many others. They differ, however, on whether to include combined 
heat and power (CHP) applications of otherwise wasted heat in electricity generation (or using 
waste heat from other industrial or commercial processes to generate electricity), reduced 
transmission/distribution line losses, and generator efficiency upgrades. Table 6 shows which 
states identify investments in each of these various additional resources as eligible for 
compliance with the EERS.  
Table 6. Additional Eligible Resources for States with EERS 
 
Elibile Resources












Iowa X X X
Illinois
Indiana
Massachusetts X X X
Maryland X X
Michigan X
Minnesota X X X
New Mexico





WashingtonResources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
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Another way to introduce flexibility to an EERS is to allow credit trading and banking, 
features of several European EERS programs that we discuss below. Most states do not allow 
trading, banking, or borrowing of energy efficiency credits to meet EERS goals. The two 
exceptions are Michigan and Minnesota.17 The Michigan EERS allows banking of Energy 
Optimization Credits. Utilities earn credits from the Michigan Public Service Commission for 
each MWh of annual incremental energy savings achieved through energy efficiency. If the 
utility exceeds its savings requirements for a particular year, it can apply its Energy Optimization 
Credits toward meeting the next year’s standard; credits cannot be banked for more than one year 
and cannot be sold to another utility. The state does not allow credits generated in the past to 
comprise more than one-third of a future year’s compliance. Energy Optimization Credits can 
also be used to help meet renewable energy goals.18 Starting in 2013, the state will allow 
additional flexibility by enabling electric providers to use credits generated from renewable 
energy production or ―advanced cleaner energy,‖ such as plasma arc gasification, to meet up to 
10 percent of the energy optimization standard. Similarly, in Minnesota, state law allows a utility 
or co-op to bank energy savings that exceed the annual savings goal. These electricity providers 
can carry forward the savings for up to three years. The state increases the banking period for 
savings accrued from electric utility infrastructure projects, allowing those savings to be carried 
forward for up to five years.19  
Measurement and Verification Practices 
The objective of an EERS is to reduce energy use below an amount that would have 
occurred but for its presence. To assess whether or not the policy objective is being achieved, 
utilities need to identify and measure the energy savings attributed to policies adopted to meet 
the EERS. Many states have their own standards or protocols, or are in the process of developing 
standards or protocols, for evaluating, measuring, and verifying the energy savings that obligated 
entities report. Measurement and verification practices vary substantially state by state, including 
differences in the legal framework of the programs, the methodologies for evaluations, and the 
assumptions used in savings calculations (Kushler et al. 2012). The reliability of these 
                                                 
17 Other studies, such as Loper et al. (2010), include a broader definition of EERS policies, and therefore include 
additional states with energy efficiency trading or banking programs. The most common is the inclusion of 
Connecticut, which allows credit trading as part of its Class III RPS program.  
18 Michigan Clean, Renewable and Efficient Energy Act of 2008. 
19 Minnesota Next Generation Energy Act of 2007.  Resources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
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measurements is central to ensuring that obligated entities comply with mandated energy 
reduction targets and that performance-based incentives and noncompliance penalties are tied to 
actual savings.20 Without accurate measurement and verification, exaggerated attributions of 
savings or inflated estimates of what business-as-usual energy use would have been absent the 
policy, make an EERS appear more effective than it actually was. 
Evaluation, measurement, and verification (EM&V), can be classified into three main 
types: impact evaluation, process evaluation, and market effects evaluation. Impact evaluations 
are primarily meant to verify the installation of energy efficiency programs and measure the 
energy savings attributable to the programs. Process evaluations study the efficacy of efficiency 
program administration, and market effects evaluations assess how energy efficiency programs 
influence markets for energy and energy-efficient products.  
Our focus is on the first of these. Impact evaluations typically focus on two measures of 
energy savings: gross energy savings and net energy savings. Gross savings is the amount of 
energy saved by consumers who participate in an energy efficiency program by, for example, 
purchasing a subsidized compact fluorescent light bulb. To calculate gross savings, evaluators 
may undertake engineering analyses of the reduced energy consumed by equipment supported by 
the program or directly measure energy consumption before and after the implementation of 
efficiency programs for a sample of participants. Various techniques are employed to control for 
year-to-year variations in external factors, such as weather. Net savings, on the other hand, is 
gross savings minus the savings that consumers would have achieved absent the policy.21 Ideally, 
net savings also account for rebound effects—that is, increases in demand for energy as a result 
of a lower cost of energy services following an efficiency upgrade (NMR Group 2010), although 
the extent to which this effect is accounted for in practice is unclear.  
Messenger et al. (2010) finds that states differ significantly in their approaches to 
translating gross savings into net savings and the resulting net-to-gross ratio. First, states vary in 
                                                 
20 Verifying savings is also important to calculating the carbon dioxide emissions reductions associated with an 
EERS, which is a common practice in many states. 
21 The difference between the two is what an economist might call the inframarginal savings, and the consumers 
who would have undertaken energy efficiency investments on their own are often ―free riders.‖ Such free riders are 
likely to be consumers who either are already aware of the financial benefits to them of energy efficiency, or who 
are willing to make sacrifices to promote the environmental and social benefits from reduced energy use. They are 
not free riders in the conventional sense of selfishly exploiting the willingness of others to provide for collective 
benefits; if anything, they are the exact opposite. Resources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
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what they assume about energy savings in the absence of the program, such as the treatment of 
savings resulting from evolving state and federal product efficiency standards. In addition, some 
states consider spillover effects when calculating net savings. Spillover accounts for the impact 
of an energy efficiency program beyond the impact on direct beneficiaries. For example, if a 
neighbor of a program participant saw the energy savings from the participant’s high-efficiency 
air conditioner and decided to purchase one not supported by the program, those spillover energy 
savings could be attributed to the program. The extent to which this is done varies across the 
states.  
States also have different rules about whether to count changes in energy consumption 
outside the state—the so-called leakage that occurs when a portion of incentive products move 
across state lines. Of the 14 states Messenger et al. reviews, 10 required free-ridership effects to 
be part of the net savings estimation. In addition, eight states required spillover and/or broader 
market effects to be considered. California was the only state analyzed that attempted to account 
for leakage in selected energy efficiency programs. The uncertainties associated with estimating 
net savings has led some states to question whether a focus exclusively on gross savings might 
be the most defensible (NMR Group 2010). 
States take a variety of different approaches to other aspects of the measurement of 
energy savings. Many efficiency programs rely heavily on ex ante estimates of savings, based on 
engineering calculations and assumptions about product use, combined with the verification of 
installations as the primary approach to assessing program effect. For some types of  efficiency 
measures, utilities use ―deemed savings‖ which are savings calculated based on assumptions 
about baseline energy use, product lifetimes and future use and applied generally to particular 
programs or investments. States also produce very different estimates of savings for the same 
investment. Loper et al. (2010) provide an example of how estimates of lifetime energy savings 
for compact fluorescent light bulb replacements in a living room differ by a factor of 4 between 
California (lowest) and Vermont (highest), with several state estimates lying in between. The 
differences in estimates stem from different assumptions about, for example, bulb lifetimes, 
hours of operation, free-riders and spillovers and wattage differences.  
Ex  post estimates of costs and energy savings are generally more accurate, particularly 
when these savings are evaluated by an independent third party, (Schiller et al. 2011), but they 
are also more expensive. Ex post assessments that look at actual energy use among participants 
before and after an energy efficiency intervention and compare these changes to a control 
group—while controlling for changes in weather, building occupancy, and other relevant 
factors—is perhaps the only way to capture the effects of a potential rebound in energy use Resources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
18 
resulting from a particular efficiency measure, but this approach is rarely used. In addition, states 
invest varying amounts of their EERS budgets in measurement and verification efforts. 
Messenger et al. (2010) reported that for programs funded by utility customers, measurement and 
verification comprises between less than 1 percent and 5 percent of program budgets. Interviews 
of energy efficiency and evaluation experts, administrators, and managers showed that 
respondents chose how and whether to conduct impact evaluations, process evaluations, or 
market effects evaluations based largely on the size of their budgets and their beliefs about the 
uncertainty of existing estimates of program savings and costs. Messenger et al. also find that 
very few states require an assessment of the uncertainty associated with measuring energy 
savings, which is particularly important for net savings.  
States also differ regarding whether they require evaluations to be conducted by 
independent entities not responsible for the success of the program. The use of independent 
evaluators can have a significant effect on the quality of evaluations. Kaufman and Palmer 
(forthcoming) find that the MWh savings results of third-party evaluations of California energy 
efficiency programs from 2004 to 2005 were systematically about 30 percent lower than energy 
savings reported by the program administrators. An important role of third-party evaluators is to 
confirm whether the reported energy efficiency technologies or upgrades were implemented, 
whether they met reasonable quality standards, and that the technologies or upgrades were 
operating correctly and had the potential to generate the predicted savings. In the more recent 
round of third-party evaluations covering the California utility energy efficiency programs 
spanning 2006–2009, evaluators confirmed electricity savings that were equal to about 93 
percent of the savings reported by utilities to the California Public Utilities Commission 
(CPUC).22  
Table 7 summarizes some of the key differences in the sample of states with an EERS. It 
highlights whether the measurement and verification program is mandated by law or regulation, 
whether results of ex post efficiency program evaluations are used to adjust deemed savings 
estimates for completed projects retrospectively or to adjust the deemed savings measures 
applied to future projects, and whether states are required to report net or gross savings or both.  
                                                 
22 These calculations include electricity savings achieved in 2006–2009 as a result of prior utility energy efficiency 
programs, inlcluding pre-2005 efforts to assist in the development of appliance and equipment standards and 
building codes. The underlying energy savings numbers reflect estimates of net savings for 2006–2008 and gross 
savings for 2009. Resources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
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Table 7. State-Level Measurement and Verification Practices 
Requirement for Evaluation





Net Savings Gross Savings  Both
Arizona x x x
Arkansas x x x
California x x x
Colorado x x x
Florida  x x x x
Hawaii x x x
Iowa x x x
Illinois x x x x
Indiana x x
Massachussetts x x x x
Maryland x x x x
Michigan x x x
Minnesota x x x
New Mexico x x x
New York x x x
Ohio x x x
Pennsylvania x x x x
Rhode Island x x x
Vermont x x x x
Washington x x x
Adjustments to Deemed 
Savings Based on Ex Post 
Evaluations
Reporting Requirements
Source: Kushler, M., S. Nowak and P. White. 2012. A National Survey of State Policies and Practices for the Evaluation of 
Ratepayer-Funded Energy Efficiency Programs, Washington, DC: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy. U112.  Resources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
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As a result of the state-by-state differences, some regional groups are beginning to work 
toward standardized EM&V protocols. These groups include the Northeast Energy Efficiency 
Partnerships (NEEP) Evaluation, Measurement and Verification Forum, the State Energy 
Efficiency Action Network, ISO New England, and PJM (Schiller et al. 2011). However, many 
of these efforts at standardization focus more on reporting and transparency about approaches 
used and thus fall short of establishing a common approach for measuring savings. For example, 
in December 2010, NEEP released its Common Statewide Energy Efficiency Reporting 
Guidelines as a model for its member states. The guidelines establish consistent definitions and 
reporting requirements for energy and demand savings, associated costs, emissions reductions, 
and jobs impacts. The guidelines would require states to report how they measured and verified 
energy savings but do not advocate for any specific measurement and verification process 
(Northeast Energy Efficiency Partnerships 2010). Were the federal government to adopt an 
EERS, particularly one that allowed interstate trading, it would likely lead to uniform EM&V 
procedures across the country. However, requiring uniformity in EM&V procedures could make 
it harder to impose a federal EERS.   
Financial Consequences of Noncomplaince  
The effectiveness of an EERS policy will likely depend on the consequences of 
noncompliance for obligated entities. States impose costs for noncompliance in several ways. 
First, utilities face political pressure to meet public utility commission orders. Utilities interact 
repeatedly with public utility commissioners, such as for periodic ratemaking hearings. Because 
of this ―repeated game,‖ utilities have an incentive to comply with the public utility commission 
to maintain good working relationships. Our focus is on explicit financial consequences of 
noncompliance. This includes the imposition of monetary penalties on obligated entities that fail 
to reach the minimum energy savings requirements and the use of positive monetary incentives 
for utilities that meet or exceed EERS standards, which effectively imposes a cost on utilities that 
fail to meet the standard. Table 8 summarizes the differences among state policies in the use of 
these two approaches.  Resources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
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Table 8. EERS Penalties and Positive Incentives for Obligated Entities 
 
Eight states impose a monetary penalty on obligated entities that fail to meet EERS goals. 
The level of these penalties varies across states, and sometimes within states, depending on the 
size of the utility. The Illinois Power Agency Act (2007) establishes penalties in years two and 
three of noncompliance. Large utilities that serve more than 2 million customers are fined 
$665,000, whereas medium-sized utilities that serve between 100,000 and 2 million customers 
are fined $335,000. If the utility is still in noncompliance after three years, the Illinois Power 
Agency will assume control over the utilities’ energy efficiency incentive programs and 
implement a competitive procurement program to raise the money needed to meet the energy 
efficiency standards.  
Thirteen states offer a variety of performance-based incentives to utilities to encourage 
compliance. These incentives are typically structured as bonuses for utilities that meet or exceed 
energy savings goals. The CPUC adopted its Risk/Reward Incentive Mechanism in September 





















* Penalty applied to adminstrator, not utilitiesResources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
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2007.23 For the 2006–2008 time period, the mechanism allowed for performance-based 
incentives if utilities met, on average, 85 percent or more of the CPUC’s savings goals for 
electricity use, peak electricity demand, and natural gas use savings, with no individual metric 
falling below 80 percent of CPUC’s goal. Reaching this benchmark allowed utilities to earn 9 
percent of the Performance Earnings Basis, which is a monetary estimate of the benefits created 
by the utility’s energy savings minus the cost of the utility portfolio. If a utility reached an 
average of 100 percent of CPUC’s goals for electricity use, peak electricity demand, and natural 
gas use, with no individual metric falling below 95 percent of the goal, the incentive increased to 
12 percent of the Performance Earnings Basis. Earnings from these incentives are capped at $450 
million for all four IOUs. (CPUC 2010). 
The state of Vermont created a hybrid policy that combines penalties and incentives. The 
nonprofit Vermont Energy Investment Corporation (VEIC) administers the state’s EERS through 
Efficiency Vermont, a ratepayer-funded state energy efficiency utility. Under the terms of its 
contract, VEIC submits a three-year budget. The Vermont Public Service Board, the state’s 
electricity regulator, withholds a portion of VEIC’s budget unless efficiency goals are met 
(Vermont Public Service Board 2009).24 For 2009–2011, the Public Service Board agreed to set 
aside 4.1 percent of Efficiency Vermont’s budget, with 60 percent of that money allocated for a 
performance-based incentive. The total set aside is estimated to be about $4.9 million over the 
three years, leaving about $2.9 million for a performance-based incentive (Vermont Public 
Service Board 2011). 
Other Regulatory Incentives 
Under traditional regulation, the distribution companies that bring electricity to customers 
collect a positive fee per kilowatt-hour (kWh) used, whereas the cost of distributing an additional 
kWh is negligible. Such a utility may lack an incentive to inform customers about opportunities 
to reduce energy use or subsidize more energy-efficient appliances or programs to reduce energy 
                                                 
23 California PUC decision 07-09-043 created the Risk/Reward Incentive Mechanism on September 20, 2007. 
24 Florida also has a combined penalty-and-incentive EERS scheme for its two major utilities, Florida Power & 
Light Company and Progress Energy Florida. Because of high projected costs for consumers, the Florida Public 
Service Commission (FPSC) passed orders in 2011 that allowed both utilities to continue to operate their existing 
energy efficiency programs instead of switching to an updated plan passed by the FPSC in 2009. As part of those 
orders, the FPSC ruled that the utilities will receive a performance-based incentive only if they exceed the new goals 
established in 2009. Penalties will be issued only for failing to achieve projected savings from the utilities’ current 
energy efficiency programs, not the more stringent 2009 standards. Resources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
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use (Brennan 2010a). On the other hand, distribution utilities that sell electricity as well as 
distribution to customers will want to supply information or technologies (such as cycling off air 
conditioners) to discourage use at peak demand periods when wholesale prices exceed retail rates 
in the absence of real-time pricing.  
Although utilities may act to reduce peak uses, the concern that distribution utilities 
would do too little to reduce electricity use overall has led some to advocate ―decoupling‖ 
distribution utility revenues from electricity used. Under a decoupling policy, a utility’s revenues 
from electricity distribution are insulated from variations resulting from sales reductions 
attributable to savings from energy efficiency programs. Of the 20 states with EERS policies, 10 
allow electric utilities to apply for decoupling. Three of the four states with the most stringent 
EERS policies—Hawaii, Ohio, and New York—all allow decoupling, as do California, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Vermont, and Washington. Other states, such as 
Pennsylvania, employ additional regulatory provisions to recover part of the revenues lost as a 
result of energy efficiency programs. If utilities earn the same revenues regardless of how much 
electricity they use, they no longer have an incentive to withhold information regarding how to 
get a given amount of lighting, heating, or cooling with less electricity or to implement subsidies 
that encourage the adoption of more energy-efficient technologies.  
Decoupling is no panacea, as guaranteeing a given amount of revenue regardless of use 
provides no incentive to promote efficiency; at most, it eliminates any bias in subsidies or 
information provision. In addition, information regarding energy efficiency is available from 
numerous public agencies, conservation advocates, and media outlets; utilities have no special 
advantage in that regard. Finally, eliminating links between revenues and energy supplied could, 
at least in theory, attenuate the incentives of utilities to prevent outages and to quickly restore 
power following outages. The main benefit of decoupling is probably not in its direct economic 
incentives, but rather that it defuses utility opposition to energy efficiency programs by keeping 
them whole.  
Policies in the European Union 
EERS policies have also been adopted in a few other countries. In Europe, the United 
Kingdom, France, and Italy all have EERS policies with penalties for noncompliance; all of these Resources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
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policies allow trading and banking of credits, referred to as white certificates.25 The United 
Kingdom adopted its white certificates scheme in 2002, followed by Italy in 2005 and France in 
2006. Each scheme includes an energy savings obligation, typically defined over a number of 
years as a specific quantity of cumulative or annual energy savings, which is apportioned to 
obligated entities (typically retail energy suppliers) in proportion to their share of the household 
retail energy market (Giraudet et al. 2011b).  
Different countries include different types of energy under their EERS programs. In 
Great Britain and Italy, the scheme originally was limited to electricity and natural gas, whereas 
in France it included all forms of energy except gasoline.26 In Great Britain, the obligation is 
placed solely on retail sales to households, whereas in the other countries all end-use sectors are 
covered, with the exception, in France, of those sectors included in the E.U. Emissions Trading 
System for carbon dioxide emissions (Giraudet et al. 2011a). Different countries also set 
different targets for different reasons. In France, for example, the target is based on a goal of 
reducing energy intensity by 2 percent per year until 2015, and then by 2.5 percent per year until 
2030 (Hamilton 2010). 
In all of these countries, the white certificates—the units of trade under these programs—
are created when an investment in an energy-efficient technology is made. The determination of 
the number of white certificates associated with that investment is typically calculated based on 
deemed savings. Countries differ, however, in the mechanisms for creating the certificates. In 
Great Britain, only obligated parties are allowed to create white certificates, whereas in Italy and 
France third parties can make investments that lead to the creation of white certificates. In Italy, 
savings are credited as they are realized, whereas in the other countries savings are credited up 
front when the initial investment is made (Pavan 2008). Italy also explicitly allows for savings to 
come from investment in CHP (Bertoldi and Rezessy 2007).  
Further, the total credits awarded for a particular type of investment vary across the three 
countries as savings are measured over different time horizons and different discount rates are 
assumed. For example, in Italy, savings for most options are counted only for the first 5 years (8 
                                                 
25 Two other countries have policies that are similar to an EERS. The state of New South Wales in Australia allows 
for the creation of greenhouse gas reduction certificates as the result of investments in energy efficiency; these 
certificates can be used for compliance with state-level greenhouse gas targets (Crossly 2008). Denmark also has an 
energy efficiency target that is sometimes described as an obligation, but is more of a voluntary standard (Hamilton 
2010).  
26 In 2010, gasoline distributors were added to the schemes in Italy and France. Resources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
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years for building insulation), but in the other two countries, lifetimes of in excess of 20 years 
are assumed for investments that last that long (Pavan 2008, Giraudet et al. 2011). Moreover, 
countries differ in terms of the reference case energy use for particular energy services, such as 
heating, existing building technologies and assumptions about technological performance.  
As a result of these differences, the types of investments that are undertaken to create 
white certificates have varied substantially across the different countries, with most of the 
investment being in insulation in Great Britain, heating equipment in France, and lighting in 
Italy. Part of the reason for the popularity of lighting in the Italian program may be because, in 
the early years of the Italian program, credits were awarded for merely giving away coupons that 
offered a discount on compact fluorescent light bulbs or water savers, without any confirmation 
that the items had actually been purchased (Giraudet et al. 2011a). The United Kingdom has no 
ex post measurement of savings. Deemed savings measures or engineering model predictions are 
the main approaches to measuring savings in Italy, where only about 10 percent of the savings 
are evaluated ex post (Bertoldi and Rezessy 2007). 
For reasons related or unrelated to the policy characteristics listed above, all of the 
programs have exceeded their goals every year in the aggregate, and no penalty payments have 
been made. The excess energy savings are being banked for future use because the targets are 
becoming more stringent over time. The amount of credit trading varies across the different 
countries, with virtually no trading in Great Britain, trading of less than 5 percent of total credits 
generated in France, and trading of more than 75 percent of the issued credits in Italy. Certificate 
trading has been limited in the United Kingdom because only obligated parties are allowed to 
undertake activities that lead to savings. In Italy, trading is essential because the obligated 
entities are the distribution companies and they rely on others with stronger commercial 
relationships with end users to supply the credits they need. Currently, white certificates are not 
traded across country borders. Estimates of the cost per unit of energy saved to obligated parties 
differ by a factor of two across the countries, whereas estimates of average social cost differ 
across the countries by a factor of four (Giraudet et al. 2011a). 
Implementation Issues 
Changes in Energy Costs  
In evaluating an EERS, the simple fact that a program reduces energy use will not be 
enough. In most states, regulators require utilities or other obligated entities to employ one or Resources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
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more cost–benefit tests to evaluate the programs they adopt to achieve the energy savings called 
for in their EERS. With some variation, five major tests, which were originally proposed in the 
California Standard Practice Manual (California Governor's Office 2001) are used: (a) the 
program administrator cost test, which focuses on the costs of running the program compared 
with the avoided resource costs of the electricity displaced by the program; (b) the participant 
test, which evaluates net revenue benefits to consumers who participate in utility-sponsored 
programs by taking advantage of subsidies for various efficiency measures; (c) the ratepayer 
impact test, which measures effects on the utility bills of all customers and not just those who 
participate in the program; (d) the total resource cost test, which measures net costs to ratepayers 
and utilities; and (e) the societal cost test, which expands the total resource cost test to include 
externality costs.27  
Although these tests differ significantly, the energy efficiency investments that each 
certifies as eligible for use in an EERS depends on the avoided resource cost of the electricity 
that no longer needs to be produced as a result of the program. The eligible set of energy 
efficiency investments will depend on the price of electricity and thus its generation cost. 
Exogenous disruptions to fuel supply for generation (storms that take out natural gas pipelines or 
large transmission lines) or environmental regulations that raise the cost of electricity generation 
could increase the set of energy efficiency investments that would pass these cost–benefit tests. 
Alternatively, technology developments that lower the cost of fuel, such as advances in 
horizontal drilling and the development of natural gas fracking technology, will lower the 
benefits of avoided energy production and potentially reduce the set of energy efficiency 
measures that pass these tests. 
Changes in fuel costs or electricity supply costs also can affect an EERS policy calculated 
as a percentage of a denominator that changes over time. Recent innovations that have lowered 
                                                 
27 Brennan (2010b) shows that, in part because they fail to focus on marginal conditions, none of these tests 
incorporates conditions for economic optimality. Moreover, the rationale for subsidizing energy efficiency generally 
requires that electricity prices be too low, which may be the case at peak periods or because of negative 
environmental externalities. None of the tests focuses on peak use, and only the societal cost tests incorporate the 
benefits of reducing environmental harms. The primary underlying principle behind these tests is that consumers are 
failing to invest in energy efficiency when such investment would benefit them. Using these or any other tests 
requires that one identify a means of assessing program benefits when the usual information on willingness to pay is 
presumptively invalid because of consumer choice failures. Some of these tests are more likely to make sense if one 
presumes that energy efficiency programs increase consumer willingness to pay for energy efficiency because they 
somehow lead consumers to value benefits they did not previously value. Whether this is the appropriate principle 
for evaluating these or any other policies in the face of consumer choice failure remains an unsettled question. Resources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
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the price of natural gas translate into lower electricity prices to customers, particularly in those 
regions of the country where electricity prices are set in competitive markets. All else being 
equal, these lower prices will result in higher electricity demand.28 The lower prices in a given 
year make fewer energy efficiency programs cost-effective. The lower prices will also, however, 
increase the quantity by which electricity use needs to be reduced under the EERS in the current 
and potentially future years, when those reductions are calculated on the basis of a percentage of 
use in the current year or a rolling average of current or past years. 
How these conflicting effects play out depends on electricity price regulation and fuel 
mix for generation. States in which electricity prices are set by the cost of service regulation may 
be slow to respond to changes in fuel prices, and these changes will tend to have a smaller effect 
on the average cost of service prices than on market-determined prices that reflect swings in 
marginal cost more closely.29 Electricity price effects will also depend on the mix of fuels and 
technologies used to supply electricity in each state or region and, in competitive regions, on 
which fuel is the marginal fuel for producing electricity.  
Utility Involvement 
A second implementation issue involves having distribution utilities serve as the sole or 
lead entities in managing, implementing, and in some cases designing programs to meet an 
EERS. They are attractive candidates, as they already play a large and crucial role in the supply 
of electricity. The Obama administration’s President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board 
(2009) has viewed utilities as ―engines of economic recovery‖ because of the potential effects of 
their involvement in energy efficiency. An immediate issue is corporate culture—enterprises that 
have been created under, motivated by, and subject to in many cases a century of regulation 
designed to supply energy are now being asked to cut back that output and transform themselves 
into ―energy services‖ companies (Fox-Penner 2010). However, our focus is on the status of 
utilities as regulated monopolies and whether they should be involved in energy efficiency at all 
(Brennan 2011).30 
                                                 
28 In a recent modeling exercise, Burtraw et al. ( November 2011) show that changes in natural gas supply forecasts 
by EIA between 2009 and 2011 resulting from new shale gas supplies led, ceteris paribus, to a roughly 3 percent 
increase in electricity demand forecasts for the next 20 years. 
29 Fuel adjustment clauses that allow regulated prices to reflect variation in fuel costs may help pass the effects of 
natural gas price savings on in prices.  
30 Note that in Europe, the obligaed entity under a white certificate program is often the unregulated retail electricity 
provider and not the regulated local distributor. Resources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
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A leading development in regulatory economics and policy in the last four decades has 
been the elimination or reduction of linkages between regulated monopolies and operations in 
competitive sectors. A leading example was the breakup of AT&T in the 1980s, settling an eight-
year-old antitrust case. AT&T was required to divest its regulated local telephone monopolies to 
keep them out of competitive long-distance and information services markets.31 The move to 
open wholesale electricity markets to competition was accompanied by Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission Order 888 in 1996 and Order 2000 in 1999 to set rules limiting the 
ability of competing generators to control operations of and access to regulated monopoly 
transmission grids (Brennan et al. 2002). 
The arguments for keeping regulated monopolies out of competitive markets rest on the 
premise that corporate affiliations spanning the regulated–unregulated boundary create the ability 
to exercise the market power that the regulation was intended to control. A regulated firm that 
owns an unregulated input supplier could charge a price above the competitive level to itself, 
passing along the higher cost to its captive ratepayers. A second potential tactic is cross-
subsidization, in which the regulated firm is able to designate costs of providing unregulated 
service as incurred on the regulated side, again leading regulated rates to increase and potentially 
establishing a credible threat of charging predatory prices in the unregulated market (Brennan 
and Palmer 1994). In electricity, the most important concern has been discrimination: a generator 
that can operate or control access to a transmission or distribution grid might be able to provide 
lower-quality or delayed services to its rivals in the generation market. The resulting competitive 
advantage allows the firm to raise its price for generation, exploiting its control over the 
monopoly grid to profit from the exercise of market power the regulation would otherwise stem. 
A striking facet of energy efficiency is that it seems particularly inviting to free entry by 
competing entrepreneurs who can offer numerous technological and service design solutions for 
reducing energy use. The vitality of this entrepreneurial response makes even more pressing the 
question of why utilities should play a central role in managing energy efficiency. A speculation, 
applicable at least at the state level in the United States, is that having utilities play a lead role 
allows state legislatures to propose and endorse energy conservation policies but to shift to state 
regulatory commissions the responsibility for funding them through electricity rate increases. 
This allows the legislature to avoid the political fallout from raising general taxes to pay for these 
                                                 
31 United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, 552 F. Supp. 131 (1982).  Resources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
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programs. The political economy of energy policy also suggests that the motive for decoupling is 
not so much to improve economic efficiency as it is to reduce or eliminate utility opposition to 
conservation programs (Brennan 2010a).
  
Though having utilities play a lead role in energy efficiency policy raises questions of 
economic efficiency and political accountability, it may yet have some advantages. If electricity 
use is itself undesirable, which would be the most appropriate rationale for an EERS, raising 
electricity prices may be a step in the right direction, so political convenience and economic 
efficiency may go hand-in-hand. One may be able to design EERS programs in which the utility 
provides the funds, but disperses them through arms-length peer-reviewed competitions that 
minimize the chance for abuses. In addition—at least if one is not using market-based 
instruments such as taxes or permit programs to meet an EERS or to address its underlying 
rationales, particularly mitigating pollution—some public or publicly-designated agency will be 
in charge of managing these programs, as is the case in several states. In doing so, one needs to 
recognize that public management may bring its own failures (Wolf 1993).  
Conclusions 
EERS policies have been adopted in 20 U.S. states and in three European countries. They 
can take numerous forms, varying by which energy sources they include, whether targeted 
reductions are specific amounts or a percentage of use in a specific past year or change over 
time, and whether the targeted reductions have to be achieved in the last year of the EERS or 
accumulated over the lifetime of the EERS. In general, we find these policies to be very 
stringent, with an average required reduction of 12.7 percent of covered load and 11.5 percent of 
total state load. Only two states allow credit banking, but several allow energy savings resulting 
from investments to reduce transmission and distribution losses, CHP systems, and other 
improvements in generation efficiency to qualify for EERS credits. Most states have an explicit 
or implicit penalty for noncompliance with savings targets, although measuring energy savings 
typically is a matter of verifying installations and using engineering methods to assign savings 
instead of a true empirically based comparison of energy use before and after a measure has been 
installed. Such measures need to account for the possibilities that some energy users would have 
made energy efficiency investments absent the EERS-supported programs and that, following 
such investments, consumers may increase their use of more efficient equipment, reducing the 
actual energy savings. 
An EERS policy, which is typically one of a suite of policies affecting the electricity 
sector, may interact with other policies. Depending on how the EERS policy is specified, Resources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
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changes in fuel supplies, such as the recent increase in natural gas production associated with the 
exploitation of shale deposits, could have important consequences for EERS stringency and ease 
of compliance that may work at cross purposes, particularly when only ―cost-effective‖ energy 
efficiency programs qualify for meeting EERS goals. Having utilities serve as the main provider 
of energy efficiency results in potentially efficiency-enhancing increases in electricity prices but 
may also unduly limit innovation and other benefits that could result from greater competition in 
the supply of efficiency-enhancing investments. Our hope is that describing EERS programs and 
examining these issues will be useful as policymakers in other states, the U.S government, and 
countries around the world consider whether and how to include an EERS in their portfolios of 
energy policies. 
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Appendix A. EERS Stringency Calculation Method 
This appendix describes the method employed to calculate the stringency of each state’s 
EERS by converting the policy’s requirements into cumulative quantity reductions, or physical 
units of energy savings in a particular year from all programs implemented up through that year. 
This method was used to produce the tables shown in the report. It can further be used to 
calculate the stringency of each EERS in each year in which it applies, both historically and in 
the future. Such a calculation would enable researchers to calculate total energy use reductions 
required by the EERS, a more complete measure of the stringency of the policy.  
Data 
We use historical electricity deliveries by retail electricity provider from EIA Form 861 
(http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia861.html) for 1999–2009, and aggregate these data 
by state and utility type. These data are referred to as the observed sales. We develop a forecast 
of future electricity consumption in the absence of energy efficiency policies by assuming a 0.9 
percent annual increase in electricity consumption in each state. This projection is referred to as 
the forecasted sales. For Maryland, the one state that denominates its policy in energy use per 
capita, we used population growth projections from the U.S. census 
(http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/projectionsagesex.html). 
Calculating Stringency 
As mentioned above, we seek to convert the requirements of each policy, whether 
initially specified in annual quantity, cumulative quantity, annual percent, or cumulative percent 
reductions, into cumulative quantity reductions, enabling comparison across the policies. 
Cumulative quantity policies are already denominated in physical units per year and thus require 
no further conversion. Annual quantity policies are converted to cumulative quantities by adding 
up the required energy savings in each year prior to the compliance year, on the assumption 
described previously that all energy efficiency programs are required at the same level of energy 
use reductions each year after they are implemented.  
Cumulative percent policies are converted to cumulative quantity policies by multiplying 
the percent reduction by the relevant basis. The relevant basis is a more complex function of 
observed sales, forecasted sales, and required energy efficiency in previous years, population, the 
basis year for fixed basis policies, and the rolling period for rolling basis policies. The formula 
for the basis varies depending on the type and units of each basis. Annual percent policies are Resources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
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converted to cumulative quantity policies by first multiplying the annual percent by the relevant 
basis and then adding up the required energy savings in each year prior to the compliance year.  
Examples 
A few examples should help clarify the set of calculations. Arizona denominates its 
policy as a cumulative percent reduction in energy use with a one year rolling basis. In other 
words, Arizona requires covered utilities to achieve energy efficiency equal to a certain percent 
of the previous year’s energy use from all programs implemented up to that year. Arizona’s 
policy covers all utilities except those specifically excluded, namely utilities with less than 
$5,000,000 in annual revenue and co-op utilities with less than 25 percent of customers in 
Arizona. These exclusions cover less than 1 percent of Arizona’s load. We convert Arizona’s 
required reductions into cumulative quantity reductions by multiplying the cumulative percent 
reduction by the relevant basis in each year.  
A similar, but slightly different policy is found in Illinois. Illinois denominates its policy 
as an annual percent reduction in energy use with a one year rolling basis. In other words, Illinois 
requires covered utilities to achieve energy efficiency equal to a certain percent of the previous 
year’s energy use from only programs implemented in the compliance year. Illinois’s policy 
covers only IOUs and excludes IOU’s with less than 100,000 customers in Illinois, resulting in 
the policy covering approximately 89 percent of state load. We covert Illinois’s required 
reductions into cumulative quantity reductions by multiplying the annual percent reductions by 
the relevant basis in each year and summing the required reductions over all previous years.  
Arkansas presents a similar policy to Illinois with a different basis. Arkansas 
denominates its policy as an annual percent reduction in energy use with a fixed basis in 2010. In 
other words, Arkansas requires covered utilities to achieve energy efficiency equal to a certain 
percent of 2010 energy use from only programs implemented in the compliance year. Arkansas’s 
policy covers only IOUs, resulting in the policy covering only approximately 61 percent of state 
load. We convert Arkansas’s required reductions into cumulative quantity reductions by 
multiplying the annual percent reductions by the relevant basis in each year and summing the 
required reductions over all previous years.  
A more dissimilar policy is provided by Maryland. Maryland denominates its policy as a 
cumulative percent reduction in per-capita energy use with a fixed basis in 2007. In other words, 
Maryland requires covered utilities to achieve energy efficiency equal to a certain percent of 
2007 per-capita energy use from all programs implemented up to that year. Maryland’s policy Resources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
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covers all utilities and thus 100 percent of state load. We convert Maryland’s required reductions 
into cumulative quantity reductions by multiplying the cumulative percent reduction by the 
relevant basis in each year. 
Challenges for Future Calculations 
We were able to perform the above calculations for electricity use under EERS policies 
because historical data on electricity use by utility and by state are readily available. Performing 
a similar calculation for electricity peak demand and natural gas policies would require finding 
similar data for those sectors; this, most likely, would pose no small challenge, especially for 
electricity peak demand.  
Algorithm 
The notation below represents the mathematical algorithm we used to calculate the 
stringency of the different state EERS policies at particular points in time. After defining the 
notation, we show that cumulative quantity reductions can be calculated given what we know 
about the policy design, what we observe about the past, and what we assume about future 
electricity demand growth (and, in the case of Maryland, population growth) in the absence of 
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Appendix B. Comparison to Sciortino et al (2011) 
The conversion in this paper enables a comparison to the other major study that has 
calculated standardized EERS stringency, Sciortino et al (2011). In their study, under the 
auspices of the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE), Sciortino et al 
calculate the cumulative percent reductions required by each EERS in 2020. We assume that the 
reductions in Sciortino et al (2011) are a percent of covered electricity use. In Table B1, we 
compare our calculated percent reductions relative to covered electricity use in 2020. To enable 
this comparison, we had to extrapolate the current policies to future years; the details of that 
extrapolation are described below.  
Table B1. Comparison of Percent Requirements with ACEEE 
 
In order to develop this comparison, we needed to project the requirements for a number 
of states out to 2020. In general, we attempted to develop projections that followed the 
previously existing pattern of required savings. Specifically, we assumed that all states with 
annual percent or quantity requirements would require the same annual reduction in every year 
after the last year defined in the policy. For states with cumulative reduction requirements, we 
Percent Requirement
State Standarized ACEEE 2011 Difference
Arizona 18.2% 22.0% -3.8%
Arkansas 6.2% 6.8% -0.6%
California 16.2% 12.9% 3.3%
Colorado 14.9% 14.9% 0.0%
Florida 4.1% 4.1% 0.0%
Hawaii 21.0% 18.0% 3.0%
Iowa 13.4% 16.1% -2.7%
Illinois 16.1% 18.0% -1.9%
Indiana 12.6% 13.8% -1.2%
Maryland 26.9% 26.7% 0.2%
Massachusetts 22.3% 26.1% -3.8%
Michigan 9.6% 10.6% -1.0%
Minnesota 14.7% 16.5% -1.8%
New Mexico 8.7% 8.1% 0.6%
New York 27.3% 26.5% 0.8%
Ohio 11.1% 12.1% -1.0%
Pennsylvania 8.2% 10.0% -1.8%
Rhode Island 23.0% 25.3% -2.3%
Vermont 25.3% 27.0% -1.7%Resources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
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assumed that the cumulative requirements would continue to increase at the same rate as they 
had in previous years.  
The table shows that the differences in the projections of the two studies are significant, 
but not huge and not systematically in one direction or the other. The precise causes of these 
differences are unclear, but likely culprits include different methodology for projecting required 
savings out to 2020 and different baselines for covered load in future years.  
Appendix C. Method for Assessing EERS Policy Features 
We researched key policy characteristics of state-level EERS by reviewing state laws and 
utility commission orders and by interviewing state program administrators. Policy 
characteristics include: eligible resources; trading, banking, and borrowing; measurement and 
verification protocols; and penalties and/or incentives. For example, we determined whether an 
EERS allows CHP, transmission/distribution savings, or generator efficiency savings to be used 
for compliance. In reviewing the documents, we labeled an EERS as including the resource if we 
found an explicit mention of that resource being usable for compliance. In the case where we did 
not find explicit mention of the eligible resources in the documents, but a program administrator 
stated that the resource was eligible, we labeled the resource as eligible. Similarly, we only 
labeled a state as having penalties and/or incentives or as having trading, banking, or borrowing 
schemes if we could locate specific language confirming these policy attributes or if a program 
administrator confirmed that these actions were allowed. Finally, we reviewed state-level 
measurement and verification protocols, focusing on states that have created their own protocols, 
such as California and Minnesota. 
Appendix D. Sources for the EERS Database 
The database of EERS policies used to produce the analysis for this paper is based on a 
wide variety of sources. The most heavily used sources were the Database of State Incentives for 
Renewables & Efficiency, managed by North Carolina State University, and the State Energy 
Efficiency Policy Database, created by the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy. 
We are very grateful to these organizations for their work in gathering the necessary information.  
We also collected information from a wide variety of primary source documents, 
including documents from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Center for Climate and 
Energy Solutions (formerly the Pew Center on Global Climate Change), Northwest Power and 
Conservation Council, Arizona Corporations Commission, Arkansas Public Service Resources for the Future  Palmer et al. 
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Commission, California Public Utilities Commission, State of Colorado, Colorado Public 
Utilities Commission, State of Connecticut, Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority, 
State of Delaware, State of Florida, Florida Public Service Commission, State of Hawaii, Hawaii 
Public Utilities Commission, State of Illinois, Illinois Commerce Commission, Indiana Utility 
Regulatory Commission, Iowa Legislature, Iowa Utilities Board, State of Maine, Efficiency 
Maine Trust, State of Maryland, Maryland Energy Administration, State of Massachusetts, 
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, State of Michigan, Michigan Public Service 
Commission, State of Minnesota, Minnesota Division of Energy Resources, Minnesota Public 
Utilities Commission, State of New Jersey, New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, State of New 
Mexico, New York Department of Public Service, New York Public Service Commission, State 
of Ohio, Energy Trust Oregon, State of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission, 
Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission, State of Texas, Texas Public Utilities Commission, 
State of Utah, State of Vermont, Efficiency Vermont, Vermont Public Service Board, Virginia 
State Corporation Commission, State of Washington, Washington Utilities and Transportation 
Commission, State of Wisconsin, and Wisconsin Public Service Commission. 
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